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Debt Settlement
A BEAST OF BURDEN WITHOUT ANY REINS
INTRODUCTION
At a recent debt-settlement industry conference, the
speakers’ stage was decorated to look like a boxing ring.1 This
backdrop was meant to symbolize the industry’s need to fight
back against its perceived opposition: lawmakers, regulators,
and consumer-advocacy groups that want to put debtsettlement companies out of business. At first glance, the
backlash against the debt-settlement industry is perplexing,
since the industry bills itself as a better alternative to
bankruptcy for consumers struggling with unsecured debt.
Irrespective of the conflict, the industry has been rapidly
growing. One estimate places the total number of debtsettlement companies at two-thousand—up from eighty or one
hundred just six years ago.2 Industry advertising is much more
prevalent and mainstream, and debt-settlement advertisements
frequently appear on the front pages of New York City
commuter newspapers. Remarkably, one major account-systems
provider recently announced that it had aggregated over $3
billion in consumer debt-settlement accounts.3
Despite this growth, few outside the industry fully
understand debt settlement as a service or its relationship to
consumer-protection law. This note attempts to fill this void by
providing a comprehensive examination of the debt-settlement
industry and the legal issues it implicates. It begins with a
brief history of debt-relief services targeting consumers. Part II
provides a detailed explanation of the debt-settlement business
model—its potential benefits and its fundamental problems
1

David Streitfeld, The Debt Settlement Industry Is Busy, But It’s a Bit
Nervous, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/business/
10debt.html.
2
Pamela Yip, Debt Settlers Attract Customers, Scrutiny: Credit Solutions CEO
Defends Ethics Amid Regulator Suits, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 30, 2009, at 1D.
3
Press Release, Persolvo Data Sys., Persolvo Data Systems Achieves $3 Billion
Milestone (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://persolvodatasystems.com/pr/Persolvo_$3_
Billion_Dollar_Milestone_Wade-Torkelson.pdf.
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that harm debt-settlement clients. Part III explains why past
efforts, at both the federal and state level, have been
inadequate to regulate this harm. Part IV discusses current
regulatory proposals in federal law and uniform state law. It
also examines the Federal Trade Commission’s recent rule
amendments that address the harms caused by debt
settlement. Finally, Part V argues that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is the ideal venue for regulating the debtsettlement industry. This part also addresses the shortcomings
of current FTC regulation. Although the FTC recently amended
its regulations—wisely banning debt-settlement companies
from collecting upfront fees—the amendments’ efficacy is
severely limited by the absence of a private cause of action
accessible to individual consumers. Administering these
regulations is necessary to both rein in the industry and to
ensure that debt-settlement services successfully assist
consumers with the burdens of unsecured debt.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEBT-RELIEF SERVICES

Debt-relief services have a long history in business and
regulation. Early in the twentieth century, debt adjusters
began operating as the first generation of this consumer
service.4 Also known as debt consolidators, debt adjusters are
for-profit services that attempt to persuade creditors to accept
a less-than-full payment and discharge the remainder of a
debtor’s obligations.5 If an agreement is reached, the debt
adjuster collects a monthly payment from the debtor and
distributes it to the creditor in accordance with the agreement.6
Myriad problems existed within this particular business
model. Debt adjusters often charged usurious rates assessed
prior to creditor payment and created unreasonable payment
plans.7 Complaints of deceptive advertising and outright fraud
were also numerous.8 Consumers unable to timely pay creditors
often found themselves in worse financial conditions after
4

Leslie E. Linfield, Uniform Debt Management Services Act: Regulating Two
Related—Yet Distinct—Industries, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2009, at 50, 51. For much
of this background on the history of debt-relief services, see UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS.
ACT, prefatory note (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2005).
5
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
6
Id.
7
Carla Stone Witzel, The New Uniform Debt-Management Services Act, 60
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 650, 651 (2006).
8
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
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working with debt adjusters.9 In response, by 1970, most states
had banned for-profit debt adjusters,10 and a majority of the
remaining states had passed strict regulatory measures.11
Despite this regulatory movement, many of these
statutes exempted nonprofit organizations from debt-adjusting
prohibitions, triggering the second generation of debt-relief
services.12 In the 1960s, a trade association of credit-card-issuing
businesses developed credit-counseling agencies for the express
purpose of reducing consumer bankruptcy filings.13 These
counseling agencies negotiate a debt-management plan (DMP)
between debtors and creditors for full payment of the debt, albeit
on modified terms.14 A counselor first determines if a modified
plan is appropriate by examining the debtor’s financial
information and then negotiating with existing unsecured
creditors for modifications (such as reduced interest rates,
lowered late fees, and time extensions for repayment).15 Once a
DMP is set, the counselor takes monthly payments from the
debtor and disburses pro-rata payments to creditors.16 Funded
predominantly by participating creditors, these credit-counseling
agencies also provide educational and financial-literacy
counseling as a part of the overall debt-management plan.17
As the amount of unsecured debt grew through the 1980s
and 1990s, so did the credit-counseling industry—creating the
third generation of debt-relief services.18 Competing trade
associations organized around aggressive marketing strategies
and cost cutting.19 These new agencies pushed for debtmanagement plans at the expense of educational initiatives and
9

Witzel, supra note 7, at 651.
Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 455-457 (McKinney 2009). New York
called debt adjusting “budget planning,” defined as
10

the making of a contract . . . with a particular debtor whereby . . . the debtor
agrees to pay a sum or sums of money in any manner or form and the person
or entity engaged in the business of budget planning distributes . . . the same
among certain specified creditors in accordance with a plan agreed upon.
Id. § 455(1).
11

Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
Id. New York explicitly exempted from its ban what it called “budget
planning” not-for-profit entities. GEN. BUS. LAW § 455(4).
13
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,995 (Aug. 19, 2009).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
17
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,990.
18
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
19
Id.
12
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individualized counseling.20 As the market grew, creditors
became less willing to fund these agencies, and higher fees were
levied on the debtor.21 Critics charge that credit-counseling
agencies now provide no social utility and operate simply as
deceptive debt collectors on behalf of creditors.22 Many critics
also allege illegal financial improprieties related to the agencies’
required use of nonprofit status.23 Due to the exemption of
nonprofits from debt-adjuster laws, this industry remains
largely unregulated.24 Nevertheless, the FTC and state attorneys
general (AGs) have pursued many enforcement actions against
credit-counseling agencies for violations of state and federal
consumer-protection laws.25
II.

DEBT-SETTLEMENT COMPANIES

A.

The Business Model

Debt settlement, the fourth generation of debt-relief
services, differs significantly from credit counseling.26 Because
the end result of a debt-settlement program is less-than-full
payment of a debtor’s obligations, the service can also be
thought of as a reappearance or reformulation of firstgeneration debt adjusters.27 Indeed, one of the main industry
trade associations describes a business familiar to consumer
law professionals:
By definition, debt settlement is the process by which a company
negotiates with a consumer’s unsecured creditors over time for a
reduction in principal, which is usually less than the current balance
owed. History shows us that an offer from creditors, collection

20

Id.
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,991.
22
Witzel, supra note 7, at 652.
23
See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.
& GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY:
ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, S. REP. NO. 109-55 (2005). Specifically,
fraud and nonenforcement were identified as major issues.
24
Witzel, supra note 7, at 652.
25
For an extensive sample of enforcement actions, see Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,991-92 nn.51-59. Generally, the FTC Act and state unfair-anddeceptive-practices laws were used. For a discussion of these laws as they relate to the
debt-settlement industry, see infra text accompanying notes 80-122.
26
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
27
Id. This comparison is not made as a conclusive argument in favor of
regulation. Debt adjusters, as discussed above, were not banned because they sought
less than full payment to creditors but because diverse, industry-wide abuse was
identified.
21
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agencies, debt buyers, and attorneys can range from as little as 5% of
the outstanding claim to as much as 90% of the outstanding
claim. . . . The process of debt settlement is, in theory, simple. A
financially troubled consumer resolves an outstanding account,
alleviating the consumer of that financial responsibility. The bank
liquidates an account, saving the account from total loss.28

Debt settlement, however, is unique. Unlike debt
adjusters, the company creates a contract and payment plan
prior to contacting or negotiating with any creditors.29 The
debtor makes payments to a savings or escrow account, and
once a target amount is achieved (often calculated based on a
percentage of the total debt owed), the settlement company
contacts the creditor and offers a sum that can be immediately
paid from that account.30 Debt-settlement companies encourage
saving enough money to effectuate settlements in escrow as
quickly as possible,31 and typically, payment plans aim for
achieving this amount in twenty-four to thirty-six months.32
Inherent in this business model is “the ability of the
debt settlement provider to time a consumer’s delinquency and
rate of savings to coincide with a creditor’s or debt collector’s
incentive to settle.”33 Generally, the industry has determined
that creditors become much more willing to settle for lower
payments once an account is more than 120 days in
delinquency.34 Consequently, debt-settlement companies
instruct clients to stop payments, default on accounts, and
cease communication with creditors.35 To achieve this
superficial divorce of debtor from creditor, debt-settlement
companies often accept power of attorney to cease
communication, instruct creditors to only contact the
settlement company, or change billing addresses to route all
creditor mail to the settlement company.36
28

U.S. ORGS. OF BANKR. ALTS., INC., DEBT SETTLEMENT: DEBT RELIEF: A
GROWING NECESSITY FOR MANY CONSUMERS 6 (2008) [hereinafter GROWING NECESSITY],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/536796-00022.htm.
29
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
30
Id.
31
ASS’N OF SETTLEMENT COS., TASC GENERAL RESPONSE TO QUESTION
CARDS FROM FTC WORKSHOP 8 (2008) [hereinafter TASC RESPONSE].
32
See Consumer Protection in the Debt Collection and Debt Management
Industries: Hearing on A. 7268 Before the Comm. on Consumer Affairs & Prot., 2009
Leg., 2 (N.Y. 2009) (testimony of Johnson M. Tyler) [hereinafter Tyler Testimony].
33
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,993 (Aug. 19, 2009).
34
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 7.
35
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,994; UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS.
ACT prefatory note 3 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2005).
36
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,994.
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Debt-settlement companies frequently calculate fees
using one of two methods: the settlement savings-fee method or
the flat-fee method.37 The former bases most of the fee on a
percentage of the savings realized by the debtor, while the
latter is based on a percentage of the total debt managed by the
settlement company.38 Additionally, enrollment fees and
monthly maintenance fees are often calculated and charged
separately.39 The FTC found that regardless of how fees are
calculated, most companies charge using a “front-end fee
model” that requires a debtor to pay a bulk of the fee within the
first few months of enrollment, “whether or not any
settlements have been attempted or achieved.”40 Some
companies also require a debtor to pay all or almost all fees
before any funds are released to creditors as a settlement.41
B.

The Good

Demand for debt-relief services is high, yet “traditional
[debt-management plans] have become less available to
consumers who increasingly have insufficient income to repay
their debts under such plans.”42 Completion of a debtsettlement program can potentially reduce the debt owed by a
consumer who is otherwise ineligible for debt management or
liquidation bankruptcy.43 A hypothetical debt situation is
helpful in understanding the potential benefit of debt-

37

See TASC RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 2; see also GROWING NECESSITY,
supra note 28, at 12.
38
TASC RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 2.
39
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 13.
40
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,994. The FTC also describes
two alternative fee structures—one in which the entire fee is collected during the first
half of the enrollment period and one in which the bulk of the fee is not paid until the
program is complete. Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 41,993; CAREONE CREDIT COUNSELING, BETWEEN FINANCIAL
BALANCE AND BANKRUPTCY: BETTER OPTIONS FOR CONSUMERS STRUGGLING TO
MANAGE UNSECURED DEBT 5 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
debtsettlementworkshop/536796-00035.pdf (estimating that, every year, “more than six
million consumers interested in the traditional DMP either opt for another solution or
do not meet the repayment criteria”).
43
Debt-management plans frequently require a debtor to show a sufficient
ability to pay, something that many debtors cannot do. See CAREONE CREDIT
COUNSELING, supra note 42, at 4. Similarly, recent amendments to the bankruptcy code
make liquidation bankruptcy more difficult to obtain because of added eligibility
requirements, which also increases filing expenses. See generally Andrew P.
MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 407 (2008).
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settlement services. A debtor that owed $10,000 in total debt
might be charged a fee of 18% under the flat-fee model (or
$1800).44 That debtor may be charged a $300 initiation fee and
a $60-per-month service fee for the entire, say, thirty-sixmonth program, resulting in service fees of $2460.45 Combined
with the flat fee, the debt-settlement-program fees total $4260.
Assume that the settlement company is able to negotiate a 40%
settlement of the total debt in this situation—a number that
debt-settlement companies claim is possible.46 In this scenario,
the debtor will have paid $4000 to settle the actual debt and an
additional $4260 in fees—a total of $8260. The debtor saved
close to 20% on the total $10,000 debt owed, and the entire
program lasted only three years. This is a best-case scenario.
C.

The Bad

The best-case scenario is not necessarily the norm. State
attorneys general report a two-fold increase in the number of
complaints against debt-settlement companies in 2009.47 Major
news outlets—including ABC’s Nightline and World News
Saturday, and CBS’s The Early Show—have recently run
features critical of the debt-settlement industry and warning
consumers of its drawbacks.48 In 2008, debt settlement was listed
in Better Business Bureau as one of the top-ten business
scams.49 Two prominent New York legal-services organizations
advise against using debt-settlement programs entirely; one
bluntly stated, “[d]ebt settlement companies are a rip-off.”50 Debt
settlement often results in unforeseen harm for consumers.
One major concern is the success rate within the
industry. A voluntary study conducted by an industry trade

44

See TASC RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 2. This hypothetical uses numbers
that two leading trade associations provided to the FTC. Id.
45
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 13. For illustrative purposes, I have
chosen potential fees on the higher side of ranges provided by debt-settlement
companies.
46
Id. at 6.
47
David Streitfeld, Debt Settlers Offer Promises But Little Help, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20settle.html.
48
See, e.g., The Early Show (CBS television broadcast May 12, 2009);
Nightline (ABC television broadcast July 25, 2009); World News Saturday (ABC
television broadcast Aug. 22, 2009).
49
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
50
Peter Dellinger, Debt Settlement Scams, EMPIRE JUST. CENTER (Aug. 13, 2009),
http://www.empirejustice.org/issue-areas/consumer-community-development/credit-cards/
debt-settlement-scams.html; Tyler Testimony, supra note 32, at 2.

1172

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

association found only a 35% to 60% debtor “completion rate.”51
Even worse, a National Consumer Law Center report stated
that only 1.4% of consumers completed a debt-settlement
program after enrolling.52 Similarly, New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo reported that one debt-settlement
company promised a 60% reduction in debt yet only achieved
those results for 1% of enrolled consumers.53 In one suit brought
by the State of Texas against a debt-settlement company, the
State alleged that the company’s own internal data showed
that fewer than 20% of individual accounts reached a
settlement of any amount.54
The FTC describes the problems with debt-settlement
services as two-fold: (1) “the marketing and advertising” of
debt-settlement programs and (2) their fundamental soundness
for consumers.55 Speaking to the former, debt-settlement
companies advertise heavily on television, radio, and the
internet.56 A common strategy is to highlight the long-term
consequences of bankruptcy and present debt settlement as a
better alternative.57 Specific outcomes are frequently touted:
Common claims in the ads . . . include representations that debt
settlement companies will obtain for consumers who enroll in a debt
settlement plan any of the following results: a reduction of their
debts by 50%; elimination of debt in 12-36 months; cessation of
harassing calls from debt collectors and collection lawsuits; and
expert assistance from debt settlement providers who have special
relationships with creditors and knowledge about available
techniques to induce settlement. Debt settlement companies also
frequently represent that there is a high likelihood (sometimes even
a “guarantee”) of success.58

51

ASS’N OF SETTLEMENT COS., STUDY ON THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 1
(2007). The study accepted companies’ self-reported completion rates, which had been
calculated using different standards. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988,
41,995 n.104 (Aug. 19, 2009). The FTC was highly critical of this methodology. Id.
52
DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., AN INVESTIGATION OF DEBT
SETTLEMENT COMPANIES: AN UNSETTLING BUSINESS FOR CONSUMERS 5 (2005)
[hereinafter UNSETTLING BUSINESS].
53
Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Sues Debt
Settlement Companies for Deceiving and Harming Consumers (May 19, 2009),
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/may/may19b_09.html.
54
Streitfeld, supra note 47.
55
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995 (internal citations omitted).
56
Suzanne Ziegler, New Law Tightens Rules for Debt Firms, STAR TRIB.
(Minn.) (June 7, 2009), http://www.startribune.com/business/47061237.html.
57
See, e.g., Streitfeld, supra note 1.
58
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995.
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In light of the industry’s low completion rates, these claims are
dubious at best.59 Touting guaranteed specific reduction
percentages and completion dates without concern for
individual circumstances or overall success rates is reckless
and deceptive. Indeed, even the executive director of a debtsettlement trade association commented, “the main concern is
consumers are being misled through false advertising.”60
More troubling are the fundamental flaws in the nature
of debt-settlement services. Debt-settlement companies claim
to maintain strong relationships with creditors61 and market
their experience with creditor settlement procedures as a
benefit.62 But it is not clear that creditors are even receptive to
working with debt-settlement companies. One executive of the
American Bankers Association—the professional association
representing the banking industry—described debt-settlement
companies as “very harmful to both creditor and consumer.”63
Another American Bankers Association senior representative
stated that creditors want to work with customers “without the
significant negative consequences to the consumer that flow
from the insertion of the debt-settlement company into the
relationship.”64 In fact, many consumer advocates recommend
contacting creditors directly to negotiate reductions as a better
alternative to debt-settlement programs.65

59

Id.
John Pacenti, McCollum: Consumers Better Off Avoiding Debt Settlement
Firms, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 20, 2008, at 1.
61
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995.
62
UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 10. One debt-settlement trade
association went so far as to state,
60

It is common for debt settlement company representatives to have a
relationship with specific contacts at creditor offices or collection agencies
that they work with in the negotiation process. Some creditors and collection
agencies have developed, or are in the process of developing, specific
departments that work exclusively with debt settlement companies. For these
creditors and collection agencies, working with debt settlement companies
allows them to handle a large quantity of accounts with a limited amount of
manpower, minimizing the costs associated with collection activity and
maximizing liquidation percentages.
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 8.
63
Streitfeld, supra note 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
Pacenti, supra note 60, at 1.
65
See, e.g., Sandra Block, When Settling Debt, Watch out for Scam Artists
Waiting to Pounce, USA TODAY, July 21, 2009, at B3; Tara Siegel Bernard, Weighing the
Options with Credit Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/16/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/16counsel.html; David Streitfeld, Credit
Bailout: Issuers Slashing Card Balances, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2009), http://www.
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Moreover, debt-settlement companies encourage debtor
default—either explicitly or implicitly—a strategy that is
unavoidably harmful to consumers.66 The industry openly
admits that delinquency aids the negotiation process.67 But
payment default has a profoundly negative impact on the
debtor more generally: “creditors often impose additional
finance charges, delinquency fees and may undertake collection
activity, including litigation.”68 This response is not surprising;
creditors may go months without receiving payment or any
communication on behalf of a debtor’s account after the debtor
enrolls in a settlement program. Payment neglect may even
accelerate the collection process.69 Indeed, one FTC enforcement
action against a consortium of debt-settlement companies
revealed that 5679 collection lawsuits were filed against the
companies’ approximately 18,116 clients during a one-year
period.70 Compounding the problem, many clients are unaware
that they are subject to traditional collection measures once
enrolled in debt-settlement programs, and debt-settlement
companies provide no assistance with the consequences.71
Additionally, debt-settlement programs are financially
infeasible for their target population of debtors:
Debt settlement companies have described the ideal debt settlement
customer as someone who is suffering from a hardship of some kind
and having difficulty making payments . . . and cannot afford to pay
their debts. Some companies will work only with insolvent
customers, defined in some cases to mean consumers who are
unemployed. Others require that the consumer be in a hardship
situation. One company states that its program is appropriate for
consumers with little or no ability to pay their debts and facing
possible bankruptcy. “It is not for people who are gainfully employed
or have high credit ratings.” Another company strongly discourages
people with good credit.72

Indeed, of the three debt-settlement clients described in a
recent New York Assembly committee hearing on the problems

nytimes.com/2009/06/16/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/16credit.html; Susan Tompor,
Be Wary of Offers to Settle Debt, BELLEVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT, May 28, 2009.
66
UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 5; Linfield, supra note 4, at 60.
67
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 7.
68
Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.
69
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,994 n.86 (Aug. 19, 2009).
70
Id. at 41,996 n.109 (citing Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, No.
SA CV 06-701 DOC RNBx (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2006)).
71
UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 6.
72
Id. at 4.
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within the industry, not one was employed.73 Monthly
charges—which include money to be put in escrow and service
fees—often exceed a client’s ability to pay.74 High monthly
payments are only exacerbated by the front-end fee model—
now an industry standard.75 Many settlement companies claim
to have a screening process to ensure that clients can afford the
given monthly payments.76 But it is hard to accept this
assertion given the extremely low success rate, the industry’s
stated preference for indigent clients, and the available
examples of common payment schedules.77 Further, for many
indigent clients, their only income and assets are exempt from
collection under applicable state and federal laws—a fact that
debt-settlement companies would undoubtedly discover under
any financial audit.78 The economically infeasible nature of
debt-settlement programs seriously undermines their utility for
both debtors and creditors.
III.

EXISTING REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Commonly used regulatory and enforcement schemes
are ill equipped to address the problems within the debtsettlement industry. Current laws were not designed with
reference to debt settlement and do not attack the industry’s
fundamental problems.79
A.

FTC Action

FTC action has been a frequent method of enforcement.
Responding to consumer complaints, the FTC targets debtsettlement companies for deceptive and misleading

73

Tyler Testimony, supra note 32, at 2-3.
UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 4.
75
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,994 (Aug. 19, 2009).
76
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 7.
77
See UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 4. One example is a $300-permonth plan set for a woman whose only source of income was Social Security. Tyler
Testimony, supra note 32, at 2.
78
See Tyler Testimony, supra note 32, at 3; see also UNSETTLING BUSINESS,
supra note 52, at 4.
79
Although the FTC has now passed rule amendments specifically
addressing the debt-settlement industry (most of which became effective on September
27, 2010), the discussion here is limited to longer-standing regulatory sources under
which enforcement actions have originated. Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
74
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advertising.80 Since 2001, the FTC has filed seven actions, some
of which involved multiple companies and individuals.81 Most
commonly, the FTC alleges violations of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act).82 The FTC Act is broadly worded,
providing that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are . . . unlawful.”83 Consequently, FTC
actions under this law have alleged violations such as
misrepresented fees, undisclosed fees, falsely promised success
rates, and failure to warn of negative consequences.84
FTC actions against debt-settlement companies have
been successful in limited circumstances. For example, one
settlement agreement stipulated that an individual defendant,
the ex-CEO of a debt-settlement company that allegedly
violated the FTC Act, could no longer engage in telemarketing
or debt negotiation.85 Similarly, a different settlement
agreement obtained by the FTC for alleged FTC Act violations
permanently banned an individual defendant and a corporate
defendant from engaging in debt-negotiation services of any
kind.86 The FTC has also recovered substantial monetary
refunds through settlements.87

80

See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,996; see also ROBERT J.
HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 624-25 (6th ed. 2008).
81
See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,996.
82
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). See, e.g., Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Connelly, No. SA CV 06-701 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2006); Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Nat’l Consumer Council, No. SA CV 04-0474 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2004); Complaint, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Debt Set, Inc., No. 07 CV 00558 (D. Co. Mar. 20, 2007).
83
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
84
See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ‘Debt Meltdown Program’
Marketers Settle with FTC; Charged with Failing to Deliver Promised Debt Reduction
Services (Aug. 5, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/08/edge.shtm; Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt-Negotiation Defendants Agree to Settle FTC
Charges in Nationwide Operation That Led Many into Financial Ruin (Sept. 25, 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/nss.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Debt Reduction Companies Settle with FTC (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/debtreduct.shtm.
85
Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Final Order as to Defendant Dennis
Connelly at 6, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06-701 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2008).
86
Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction Against
Defendants Todd A. Baker and Debt Resolution Specialists, Inc. at 8-9, Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Innovative Sys. Tech., Inc., No. CV 04-0728 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2005).
87
See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt Services Operations
Settle FTC Charges (Mar. 30, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/
creditcouncel.shtm. Here an FTC settlement agreement with NCC required corporate
defendants to pay $1 million and three individual defendants to pay $3.5 million, after
the FTC had recovered $24 million in funds held in corporate trust accounts. Id.
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Despite these successes, the FTC is not able to address
the full extent of abuse in the debt-settlement industry. As an
agency, the FTC is tasked with numerous categories of
consumer protection involving many statutes—resulting in
limited resources for any one issue.88 Indeed, while the FTC has
identified abuse in the industry widespread enough to justify
increased regulation,89 it has only brought seven enforcement
actions since 200190—despite its broad discretion under the
FTC Act to determine what actually constitutes consumer
harm.91 Additionally, the FTC Act, under which the FTC has
achieved most of its settlements, disallows private causes of
action.92 This means that individuals who are harmed by
violations of the Act are “encouraged to complain to the
Commission, [but their] complaints give them no formal
standing before the Commission or the courts.”93 Thus,
recognizing its internal limitations, the FTC itself has
advocated the creation of private causes of action for consumer
matters.94 Finally, while FTC enforcement has been able to
selectively shutter debt-settlement companies for employing
deceitful advertising, the FTC Act does not address the
fundamental problems of the industry—namely, untenable fee
structures, and harmful delays between client payments and
services rendered.95

88

Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 95 (2008).
89
See Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10,
2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
90
See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,994, 41,996 (Aug. 19, 2009).
91
Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2005).
92
PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAW PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3.04 (Law Journal Press 2010).
93
Id.
94
William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L.
REV. 724, 729 n.10 (1972) (“FTC enforcement effort against deceptive trade practices
suffers from crucial and probably inherent limitations. . . . [T]he federal effort is
modestly staffed, far removed from most local communities, and, consequently, must be
concentrated against national media advertising with only occasional test cases against
smaller scale law violators. In recent years . . . the FTC itself [has] strongly endorsed
and emphasized the need for . . . viable private remedies for consumers.”).
95
On at least one occasion, the FTC brought an action for FTC Act violations
based on failure to disclose the potential harmful effects of discontinuing payment to
one’s original creditors. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fraudulent “Debt
Negotiators” Settle FTC Charges (July 19, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2005/07/briggsbaker.shtm. But this allegation still does not address the
fundamental problems of the debt-settlement model. A company could easily comply
with the law by using contractual fine print and simultaneously do nothing to protect
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State Attorneys General

Like the FTC, state attorneys general also frequently
target debt-settlement companies in civil actions.96 Often, AGs
allege unfair or deceptive acts and practices committed by debtsettlement companies in violation of state consumer law.97 For
example, in May 2009, New York Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo filed suit against two debt-settlement companies
alleging deceptive business practices and false advertising.98
The suits followed subpoenas issued by the AG to fourteen
debt-settlement companies requesting information about fee
structures, completion rates, and services rendered.99 One of
these cases has already been decided, levying a civil penalty of
$198,100 against Nationwide Asset Services, Inc. for
defrauding 1981 consumers.100 The court also ordered a
complete refund to 180 consumers and enjoined the company
from doing further business in New York unless it provided a
$500,000 performance bond.101
Although these AG actions can be financially effective for
select consumers, they provide only short-term solutions that
clients from the permanently damaging actions of creditors once payments and
communication cease.
96
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,997 (Aug. 19, 2009).
97
Id. at 41,996. For an extensive list of AG enforcement actions from around
the country, see id. at 41,997 nn.132-33. For a discussion of state deceptive-acts laws,
also called “little FTC Acts,” see Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 91, at 15. AGs also
frequently target debt-settlement companies for violations of more narrowly written
debt-management statutes. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,997 n.134.
State laws specifically targeting debt-management services are discussed at length
infra Part IV.B. And because New York has not yet passed this type of legislation, a
description of its enforcement is not relevant here.
98
Verified Complaint, Cuomo v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., No.
401225/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2009); Verified Petition, Cuomo v. Nationwide
Asset Servs., Inc., No. 2009-5710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 2009). Both complaints alleged
that defendants Nationwide Asset Services and Credit Solutions of America Inc. (CSA)
engaged in fraud, deceptive business acts, and false advertising in violation of New
York law; only the CSA complaint alleged violations of New York’s credit-services law.
These particular New York statutes are discussed infra Part III.B in the context of
private causes of action.
99
Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces
Nationwide Investigation into Debt Settlement Industry (May 7, 2009), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/may/may7a_09.html.
100
Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Obtains Court
Order Barring Debt Settlement Company that Ripped Off Thousands of New York
Consumers from Operating in NYS Unless It Meets Strict Requirements (Oct. 15,
2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/oct/oct15b_09.html.
According to the AG’s office, the “court found that the majority of . . . customers were
promised a 25 to 40 percent reduction in their outstanding debt but never saw such
reductions. Only one-third of one percent of consumers received such savings.” Id.
101
Id.
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are limited in ways similar to FTC actions. The New York AG’s
office does not prosecute directly on behalf of individual
consumers; there must be a widespread need for it to proceed.102
The result is that lone consumers may not be able to use the AG
to enforce their legal rights. Further, these New York cases are
based on laws that address only general fraudulent and
deceptive practices by debt-settlement companies. Accordingly, a
debt-settlement company can easily comply with basic disclosure
requirements while simultaneously collecting upfront fees that
far exceed the value of services rendered. Similarly, AG actions
fail to address the industry’s fundamental problems because
they are brought under state laws with limited breadth. Like the
FTC, AGs cannot target infeasible fee structures or delays in
services that cause creditors to pursue debtors for payment
defaults while under a debt-settlement program. Absent false or
misleading statements, the AG is unable to act against debtsettlement companies.
C.

Private Enforcement

Private causes of action also target debt-settlement
companies with varied but less-than-sufficient success. The
Federal Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) is one statute
that allows individuals to assert violations by debt-settlement
companies.103 The CROA provides that “credit repair
organizations” may not receive money or valuable
consideration in advance of performing agreed-upon services.104
A credit-repair organization is defined as any person or entity
that provides services for the express or implied purpose of
either (1) “improving any consumer’s credit record, credit
history, or credit rating” or (2) “providing advice or assistance
to any consumer with regard to” such services.105 In passing the
CROA, Congress desired to ensure that consumers had
102

Indeed, in the two cases against debt-settlement companies, 18,000 New
York residents had enrolled with one company, while 1981 had enrolled with another
one, illustrating the size of cases taken by the AG. David Streitfeld, New York Accuses
2 Debt Settlement Firms of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/05/20/business/20debt.html.
103
15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679j (2006). See, e.g., Complaint, Yunker v. Rise Above
Debt Relief LLC, No. 09-CV-1204-01 (D. Kan. June 30, 2009); Complaint, Boyken v.
Am. Debt Arbitration, No. 6:07-cv-06348 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007); Complaint, Cortese
v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No. CV-04 0956 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
104
15 U.S.C. § 1679b(b).
105
Id. § 1679a(3). Nonprofit organizations and a particular debtor’s original
creditors are explicitly exempted from the statute’s provisions. Id.
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necessary information when purchasing such services, and to
protect the public from unfair and deceptive business practices
in the industry.106
Debt-settlement fee structures would violate the
CROA’s ban on upfront fees because no debt-settlement
company begins negotiations with creditors until all or a
substantial portion of fees have been collected.107 But in the
limited cases on the issue, courts have refused to find that
debt-settlement services alone fulfill the CROA’s definition of a
credit-repair organization.108 Absent a showing that the
company, at a minimum, advertised or engaged in specific
credit-related issues, courts are unwilling to declare that debtsettlement companies are credit-repair organizations. In
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., for example, an Illinois district
court held that a debt-settlement company administering a
credit-repair program was not a credit-repair organization
because the company had “ma[de] clear that participation in
[its] program [would] likely result in damage to the
participant’s credit” and “that the participant’s credit is outside
the scope of the program.”109 Thus, the court concluded, the
company “did not represent or even imply that [its] program
was designed to improve the participant’s credit as required for
[it] to be a credit repair organization.”110 Indeed, the debtsettlement companies that the courts have deemed creditrepair organizations have aimed, explicitly or implicitly, to
improve their clients’ credit rating.111 In light of this case law, a
debt-settlement company can easily avoid CROA liability by
tailoring its representations while still retaining harmful
aspects of its business model.

106

Id. § 1679(b).
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,994 (Aug. 19, 2009).
108
See HOBBS, supra note 80, at 624-25.
109
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
The court stated that “[w]hether a company is a credit repair organization under the
CROA depends on the representations made.” Id.
110
Id.
111
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254-57
(N.D. Ala. 2008) (finding that a debt-settlement program that advertised credit
improvement met the CROA’s definition of credit-repair organization), vacated on other
grounds, Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009); Cortese v.
Edge Solutions, Inc., No. 04-0956, 2007 WL 2782750, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007)
(holding that a debt-settlement company was a credit-repair organization because it
advertised and rendered a supplemental program explicitly designed to repair credit
following the traditional settlement program).
107
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CROA’s legislative history also does not support the
statute’s application to the debt-settlement industry. A U.S.
House of Representatives report accompanying the CROA’s
passage states that “[t]he credit repair business involves the
marketing of credit repair services to consumers whose
consumer reports contain adverse information that interferes
with their ability to obtain credit.”112 More succinctly, “credit
repair organizations . . . help consumers eliminate adverse
information from consumer reports.”113 Debt-settlement
companies, however, do not purport to perform this function.
Rather, these companies exist to eliminate outstanding debt on
their clients’ behalf. Absent material representations about
improving credit worthiness, debt settlement does not fall
within Congress’s purpose in enacting the CROA.114 Although
the CROA may be useful for certain consumers, it is
inadequate as regulation of the industry as a whole.
Many states have enacted CROA analogs that provide an
additional private cause of action for debt-settlement clients.115
For instance, New York’s CROA analog applies to “credit
services businesses”—defined identically to the federal CROA’s
credit-repair organizations.116 The New York law imposes specific
disclosure requirements on credit-services companies and
112

Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 513 (N.D. Ga.
2006) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-486, at 57 (1994)).
113
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-2009, at 7 (1993)).
114
For an extensive discussion of the CROA’s legislative history, see id. As the
district court noted in Hillis,
To utilize an analogy from the sport of golf, a [credit-repair organization] is
like a person who offers to improve a golfer’s score after a round is over by
reviewing and making changes to the golfer’s score card or by telling the
golfer how he can make changes to his score card. By contrast, a person who
offers to give a golfer swing tips to improve his score the next time he heads
out on the course is not a [credit-repair organization].
Id. at 514. The Hillis court was not discussing debt-settlement companies, but the
distinction between editing a scorecard and performing differently in the future is
relevant. Congress intended the CROA to regulate the former while debt settlement is
a service much more like the latter.
115
For a comprehensive discussion of various state credit-repair laws and
their scope, see CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 15.3
(6th ed. 2006).
116
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 458-a to 458-k (McKinney 2009) (defining a credit
service business as person who provides “a service for the express or implied purpose of
improving a consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or providing advice or
assistance to a consumer with regard to the consumer’s credit record history or rating
in return for the payment of a fee”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3) (2006) (codification of
the federal CROA). New York law, like the federal CROA, exempts nonprofits and
original creditors from regulation. GEN. BUS. § 458-b.
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prohibits them from accepting fees before performing services.117
Given the New York CROA’s similarity to its federal
counterpart, courts are likely to interpret its definitional scope
similarly: debt settlement qua debt settlement is not a creditservices business.118 Indeed, state credit-repair laws “generally
cover the same variety of organizations as the [federal CROA].”119
Just as the federal CROA does not adequately regulate the debtsettlement industry, it is unlikely that courts will read state
analogs to do so.
Additionally, New York’s deceptive-acts-and-practices
law provides a private cause of action that may also apply to
the debt-settlement industry.120 Section 349 states very simply
and broadly that “[d]eceptive acts and practices in the conduct
of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any
service in this state are hereby declared unlawful.”121 Modeled
on the FTC Act provision discussed above,122 New York courts
have interpreted section 349 using FTC Act case law and
legislative history.123 Since the FTC has been relatively
successful in the few actions it has brought against debtsettlement companies, similarly situated plaintiffs in New York
may be successful in section 349 actions. At least one suit
brought under section 349 against a debt-settlement company,
for example, settled out of court. The complaint, filed in the
Western District of New York, alleged numerous section 349
violations for a debt-settlement company’s statements about
117

GEN. BUS. §§ 458-d, 458-e.
Although plaintiff Cortese pleaded violations of section 458, the court
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds without
discussing the merits of the plaintiff’s state-law claims. Cortese v. Edge Solutions, Inc.,
No. 04-0956, 2007 WL 2782750, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007). Cortese, therefore,
provides no insight into how it would apply section 458 to a debt-settlement company.
119
WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 115, at § 15.3.2. But New York credit-repair
law does explicitly exempt “[a]ny person admitted to practice law in this state where
the person renders services within the course and scope of his or her practice as an
attorney at law.” GEN. BUS. § 458-b(1)(b). There is no similar exemption under the
federal CROA. This New York exemption would be relevant in a situation where a law
firm provides debt-settlement services (and, thus, might claim exemption from the New
York law). While the intended scope of the exemption is unclear, one could argue that
debt settlement is not “within the course and scope” of law practice and should
therefore not be exempted.
120
See GEN. BUS. § 349.
121
Id. § 349(a).
122
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Indeed, these state laws are known as “little FTC
Acts.” Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 91, at 15 (quoting J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam,
New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative
Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 357 (1992)).
123
State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. Colo. State Christian Coll. of Church of Inner
Power, Inc., 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
118
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the time required for services to be rendered and the success
rates of its program.124
Nonetheless, section 349 has many of the same
limitations as its federal counterpart. While section 349 may
benefit certain individuals, like the FTC Act, it addresses only
deceptive behavior. In enacting section 349, the New York
legislature did not intend to address debt-settlement companies;
indeed, its passage predates the rapid expansion of debtsettlement usage. Consequently, section 349 does not address
the core problems of the debt-settlement industry. Section 349
provides consumers with only a limited resource and contributes
little to the needed comprehensive regulatory framework.
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Public concerns about the debt-settlement industry have
not escaped the attention of regulators and legislators—federal
and state alike. This section provides a detailed explanation of
recent legislative efforts, as well as rule amendments passed by
the FTC to regulate the debt-settlement industry.
A.

Congressional Efforts

The U.S. House of Representatives has proposed a few
different measures to address the deleterious effects of debt
settlement. In 2003, the House proposed a resolution that
mandated significant advertising and contract disclosures, and
prohibited upfront fees.125 The bill also banned debt-settlement
companies from advising clients to discontinue payments owed
to their original creditors.126 The bill was referred to committee
in late 2003, and has not been voted on or reintroduced since.127
More recently, the House introduced a bill that would
give the FTC expedited rulemaking powers to regulate debt-

124

Complaint at 10, Boyken v. Am. Debt Arbitration, No. 6:07-cv-06348
(W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007).
125
Debt Counseling, Debt Consolidation, and Debt Settlement Practices
Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 3331, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
126
Id. § 1003(c)(1).
127
See H.R. 3331 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.
loc.gov (follow “Try the Advanced Search” link; then select “108” under “Select
Congress”; then select “Bill Number” in the drop-down menu under “Enter Search”;
then enter “H.R. 3331” in text search box; then follow “search hyperlink”; then follow
“All Congressional Actions” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); see also Library of
Congress, THOMAS ONLINE DATABASE, http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
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settlement companies.128 Specifically, the bill directs the FTC to
consider banning upfront fees and requiring certain disclosures
by the debt-settlement industry.129 No action has been taken on
this bill since June 3, 2009,130 likely due, in part, to the FTC’s
broader independent efforts and Congress’s proposals for
institutional change. As discussed below, the FTC
independently passed amended rules creating regulations
pertaining to “debt relief services”131—entirely supplanting the
need for the House’s expedited rulemaking.
Additionally, Congress recently passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which
created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.132 The
bureau is tasked with regulating all financial products and
services, which are defined to explicitly include debt-settlement
services.133 That Congress specifically tasked a new federal
agency with regulating the debt-settlement industry suggests
that it is unlikely to pursue further legislation.
B.

Uniform State Laws

Although congressional action is frozen, state
legislatures have recognized the need to tackle the problems of
the debt-settlement industry. As discussed above, states have
commonly regulated debt-relief services in the past through
piecemeal legislation.134 Recently, however, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) began an effort to reverse this trend.135 In 2005, the
NCCUSL approved for dissemination a final version of the
Uniform Debt-Management Services Act (UDMSA).136 In brief,
128

Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act, H.R. 2309, 111th Cong. (1st

Sess. 2009).
129

Id. § 2(b).
See H.R. 2309 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.
loc.gov (follow “Try the Advanced Search” link; then select “111” under “Select
Congress”; then select “Bill Number” in the drop-down menu under “Enter Search”;
then enter “H.R. 2309” in text search box; then follow “search hyperlink”; then follow
“All Congressional Actions” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
131
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,988 (Aug. 19, 2009).
132
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5491).
133
Id. § 1002(15)(A)(viii)(II).
134
See supra Part I.
135
For a full background and history of the NCCUSL, see generally James J.
White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096 (1991).
136
Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum & Jonathan L. Pompan, Proposed Uniform DebtManagement Services Act to Effect Major Changes in the Law, 123 BANK. L.J. 502, 502 (2006).
130
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the UDMSA purports to regulate debt-management services,
including both credit-counseling agencies and debt-settlement
companies.137 Of course, the UDMSA is not law at promulgation;
state legislatures must adopt and enact its provisions.138 But a
handful of states have enacted the UDMSA so far.139
At its foundation, the UDMSA prohibits companies and
individuals from providing “debt management services”
without registering at the state level.140 Debt-management
services are defined “as an intermediary between an individual
and one or more creditors for the individual for the purpose of
obtaining concessions.”141 The comments to this subsection
clarify that debt-management services encompass any
intermediary that attempts to change the terms of a debt
contract—even when the intermediary does not have control
over an individual’s escrow funds—and explicitly mention debtsettlement companies.142 The UDMSA exempts specific entities
from its coverage.143 The UDMSA also includes alternative
language that allows states to decide whether to allow forprofit companies.144 For example, a state could enact UDMSA
language banning all for-profit debt-settlement services; or it
could opt for language allowing only for-profit debt-settlement
services and prohibiting for-profit credit counseling.145
137

Id.
White, supra note 135, at 2096.
139
E.g. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.5-201 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN.
TIT. 6 § 2401A (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1116 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 332A.02 (West 2010); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2401 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 19-14.8-1 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-7-101 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-42-101 (West 2010). The UDMSA has also been proposed in New York. The bill
adopting the UDMSA regulations was introduced in the New York Assembly and was
referred to the Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee on March 27, 2009. The
committee held a hearing on May 8, 2009. N.Y. Assemb., A. 7268, 2009 Leg. (N.Y.
2009). But no action has since been taken on the bill.
140
UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT § 4(a) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 2005). Registration is made with a state agency designated or created
by a state for administering the UDMSA. Id. § 2(1). Approval of registration in one
state shall be accepted as valid in another state so long as the information is
substantially similar or more comprehensive than that required by the second state. Id.
§ 12(1).
141
Id. § 2(9).
142
Id. § 2 cmt. 8. The UDMSA is also explicitly intended to cover creditcounseling agencies. In fact, when originally written in 2003, the UDMSA only covered
credit-counseling agencies. Debt-settlement companies were not included until a
NCCUSL decision in 2004. Id. at 4 (prefatory note).
143
For example, judicial officers and banks are specifically exempted. Id. § 3.
144
Id. § 4(d).
145
Id.; see also Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 136, at 506. For example, the
version proposed by the New York legislature, see supra note 139, would require any
138
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Once registered, the UDMSA imposes significant
regulation on a debt-settlement company. One drafter described
UDMSA regulations as “four pillars” that respond to recognized
past abuse by “(1) safeguarding the debtor’s money; (2)
disclosing the credit counselor’s relationship with and payment
by creditors; (3) requiring adequate financial education; and,
perhaps most importantly, (4) requiring credit counselors to
determine that a [debt-management plan] is suitable for the
debtor before enrolling the debtor in [the plan].”146
The UDMSA purports to accomplish the first goal—
safeguarding a debtor’s money—in several ways. First, it
requires registered companies to provide extensive biographical
information.147 This requirement is intended to prevent highway
banditry and to lower enforcement costs by allowing a state
administrator to easily locate companies. Additionally, the
UDMSA mandates that registered companies have a bond,
certificate of insurance, or letter of credit in an amount deemed
sufficient to cover potential payments of damages—which
protects against company insolvency.148 Trust accounts (also
known as escrow accounts) must conform to specific guidelines:
notably, money in a trust must be promptly returned to the
individual upon cancellation of a service program.149 Finally, the
UDMSA specifically limits the fees that a debt-settlement
company may charge.150 Service fees are not to exceed $50
monthly; set-up fees are not to exceed $400 monthly; and debt-

debt-management company—including debt-settlement companies—to be nonprofit
before registering and conducting business in New York. N.Y. Assemb., A. 7268, 2009
Leg. Sess. § 579-C (N.Y. 2009). The specific language, borrowed directly from the
UDMSA, provides that no company may register unless it is (1) organized and properly
running as a not-for-profit under the law of the state in which it was formed, and (2)
exempt from taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. Despite this
for-profit ban, however, the New York bill as proposed does not alter the UDMSA’s
general fee-cap provisions. Id. § 584-B. Indeed, New York specifically uses the UDMSA’s
language providing for a maximum initial fee of $400, a maximum monthly fee of $50,
and a maximum of 30% of the amount saved on any settled debt. Id.
146
Witzel, supra note 7, at 653. Disclosing details of any relationship with
creditors is more relevant to credit counselors that are employed or paid by creditors.
As previously noted, debt-settlement companies do not have a history of opaque
relationships with creditors; in fact, creditors often disapprove of the debt-settlement
industry. See supra Part II.C. As such, this particular type of regulation will not be
discussed here.
147
UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT § 6 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif.
State Laws 2005).
148
Id. §§ 13, 14.
149
Id. § 22(h).
150
Id. § 23.
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settlement companies may only charge up to 30% of the
amount saved on a settled debt.151
The UDMSA goal of “requiring adequate financial
education” speaks to disclosure as well as education. Prior to
performing
debt-management
services,
debt-settlement
companies must provide an itemized list of services and
charges, as well as a list of predicted settlement outcomes with
each creditor.152 In addition, the UDMSA requires that these
companies disclose the adverse consequences of participating in
their programs. Companies must inform clients that the service
may adversely affect their credit scores.153 They also must
advise clients that there may be better alternatives like
bankruptcy and that any settled debt may be taxable as
income.154 Supplementing these disclosure requirements, a debtsettlement company is required to provide prospective clients
with “reasonable education about the management of personal
finance.”155 According to the comment accompanying this
subsection, education may be a “group class” or an “electronic
educational program,” but it “must be substantially more than
an explanation of the benefits of a plan.”156 Noting that
financial-literacy education is becoming more commonplace,
the UDMSA comments also explain that the state
administrator may promulgate more detailed rules for
education as standards for effective financial literacy develop.157
Finally, the UDMSA regulations require a debtmanagement service to determine that a particular plan is
suitable for an individual before the individual enrolls in the
151

Id. The numbers presented here are absolute-maximum amounts allowed
under the UDMSA. Actual fee structures are based on the amount of debt under
contract in various ways. For example, a debt-settlement company may only charge a
set-up fee “in an amount not exceeding the lesser of $400 and four percent of the debt
in the plan at the inception of the plan.” Id. § 23(d)(2)(A). The UDMSA also requires
that debt-settlement contracts provide cancellation within three days of creation with
no obligation and cancellation upon notice by the individual at anytime with the right
to a refund of unexpended funds. Id. §§ 19, 20. This protects a debtor’s money by
allowing cancellation of a contract without liability for further payments.
152
Id. § 17(a), (c). Prediction of settlement outcomes need not be particular as
to an amount. The UDMSA creates four categories in which a creditor must be
predicatively placed by a debt-settlement company: (1) those that will participate and
grant concessions, (2) those that will participate but not grant concessions, (3) those
that will not participate, and (4) all others. Id. § 17(c)(3).
153
Id. § 17(d).
154
Id.
155
Id. § 17(b)(1).
156
Id. § 17 cmt. 2.
157
Id.
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service’s plan.158 For a prospective client of a debt-settlement
company, suitability “means at a minimum that the individual
does not have the ability to satisfy creditors out of current
income within a reasonable time even if the creditors were to
reduce finance charges and fees for late payment, default, and
delinquency.”159 A debt-settlement company must also
determine that an individual will be able to fulfill the payment
schedule of the chosen settlement plan.160
To enforce the UDMSA regulations, the UDMSA gives
the state administrator power to order a cease and desist, to
order payment of restitution, and to prosecute a civil action
independently or on an individual’s behalf.161 In addition to
public enforcement, an individual may bring a civil action to
recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
reasonable attorney’s fees.162
C.

FTC Rulemaking

Apart from federal and state legislation, the FTC has
recently adopted rule changes targeting the debt-settlement
This
rulemaking
amended
the
current
industry.163
Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) to bring more aspects of debtrelief services within the regulations.164 Generally, the TSR
regulates various business practices of companies engaged in
telemarketing.165 Telemarketing is defined as (1) soliciting the
sale of goods or services using a telephone and (2) making more
than one interstate phone call.166 Previously, the TSR applied
only to outbound calls made by debt-relief services.167 But the
new rule encompasses inbound calls as well, bringing “virtually
all debt relief telemarketing transactions” within the TSR’s

158

Id. § 17(b)(3)(B).
Id. § 17 cmt. 4.
160
Id. § 17(b)(3)(B).
161
Id. § 33. The state administrator is the agency or entity chosen by the state
to enforce the UDMSA. Id. § 2(1).
162
Id. § 35.
163
Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). The deadline to submit written comments in
response to this rule’s requisite notice of proposed rulemaking was October 9, 2009.
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988 (Aug. 19, 2009).
164
See Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,458.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 48,501-02.
159
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coverage.168 At the outset, it is important to understand that the
statute authorizing the FTC to implement the TSR (and thus,
this proposed rulemaking) creates a federal private cause of
action for injunctive relief or damages, provided that the
amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.169
Under the new rule, a debt-relief service is defined
broadly and is intended to cover debt-settlement services.170
Specifically, a debt-relief service is defined as
any program or service represented, directly or by implication, to
renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter the terms of payment or other
terms of the debt between a person and one or more unsecured
creditors or debt collectors, including, but not limited to, a reduction
in the balance, interest rate, or fees owed by a person to an
unsecured creditor or debt collector.171

In promulgating this new rule, the FTC sought to regulate all
procedures sold to consumers, and it added the word “program”
to ensure this wide breadth.172
The new FTC rule also subjects debt-settlement
companies to mandatory disclosure, an important aspect of
regulation for the FTC. Under one general set of provisions,
debt-settlement companies must disclose (1) the total costs of
services; (2) all “material restrictions, limitations, or conditions
to purchase, receive, or use the goods or services”; and (3) the
seller’s refund policy.173 The rule also mandates disclosure of the
time required to achieve resolution—including the specific time
when a settlement company will tender settlements to
creditors—and the amount of money that must accumulate

168

Id. As an initial matter, these amendments are subject to the jurisdictional
limitations of the TSR and the FTC Act. One noteworthy limitation is that all nonprofit
entities are exempted from these regulations. Id. at 48,465-66. The FTC acknowledged
concerns that many abusive debt-relief services might remain unregulated because
they are technically nonprofits. Id. at 48,465. It concluded, however, that it lacks
authority under the TSR’s governing statute to regulate nonprofit entities. Id. at
48,465-66.
169
15 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006). The statute also provides a civil cause of action for
any state attorney general. Id. § 6103.
170
Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,516-17. The last
clause of the definition, however, limits the definitional scope to unsecured creditors or
debt collectors operating with unsecured debt. This was done intentionally to exclude
mortgage loan-modification plans. The FTC noted that there are problems with
fraudulent mortgage-relief companies that are similar to debt-settlement operations
but that need to be regulated in different ways for various reasons. Id.
171
Id. at 48,516-17.
172
Id. at 48,466 n.123.
173
Id. at 48,517.
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before settlement is offered.174 Additionally, the new rule
requires that debt-settlement companies advise clients of
certain risks—namely, that creditors may pursue collection
efforts (including litigation) during the debt-settlement
program, and that participating in a settlement program will
likely result in an adverse credit rating and may increase the
total amount of debt owed.175
Much beyond disclosure, the FTC also adopted a
solution to the unsound practice of charging upfront fees. The
new rule prohibits requesting or receiving payment for any
debt-relief service unless the company has “renegotiated,
settled, reduced, or otherwise altered the terms of at least one
debt pursuant to a settlement agreement.”176 This upfront-fee
ban applies to all debt-relief services—including debtsettlement companies, which, as explained above, hold a
client’s funds in escrow until enough have accumulated to offer
a settlement. The rule states that the FTC “does not intend
that the advance fee ban be interpreted to prohibit a consumer
from using legitimate escrow services . . . to save money in
anticipation of settlement,”177 though this language does seem
to explicitly prohibit collecting any part of a flat fee prior to
settling a debt.178
Less clear, however, are other fees often charged by
debt-settlement companies—namely, service fees, initiation
fees, and other account-maintenance or administrative-type
fees. Companies charge these fees before any debt has been
settled, but one could argue that this practice does not violate
the ban on upfront fees because these other fees are required to
facilitate escrow services for the client until enough funds have
accumulated. The FTC has concluded, however, that all upfront
fees charges by debt-relief providers are an abusive business
practice.179

174

Id. at 48,518.
Id.
176
Id. at 48,519.
177
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988 (Aug. 19, 2009).
178
See supra Part II. A flat-fee model charges a percentage of the total debt
and is typically collected—entirely or in part—before any settlement is achieved.
179
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42,006. To determine if a
practice is abusive, the FTC uses a three-prong unfairness test. A practice is unfair if
“1) the conduct at issue causes substantial injury to consumers; 2) the harm resulting
from the conduct is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits; and 3) the harm is
not reasonably avoidable.” Id. at 42,005.
175
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THE IDEAL REGULATION

To determine ideal regulation of the debt-settlement
industry, one must answer two questions: (1) where should
regulation originate,180 and (2) what particulars should the
regulation include?
A.

Source of Regulation

To the first question, we have seen potential regulation
originate from uniform state law, federal law, and federalagency regulation. Congress’s recent actions in regulating debtrelief services show that it is likely to stay out of the issue.181 As
a practical matter, then, it is appropriate here to analyze the
benefits of uniform state law and federal-agency regulation.
The NCCUSL is known as a private legislature because
it cannot pass binding laws; it can only suggest passage to
traditional legislatures.182 It has also been called an elite
legislature because its members are chosen by state governors
based on their expertise and sophistication in a particular area
of law.183 As one commentator has noted, NCCUSL
“[c]ommissioners are likely to draft laws that are clearer, better
understood, and with more insight” than state legislatures.184
Even if true, however, these factors may not warrant
placing regulation of the debt-settlement industry in the
NCCUSL’s hands. One problem is that the NCCUSL
coordinates and embraces interest-group activities, injecting
bias into uniform laws.185 The NCCUSL invites interest-group
advisers and self-interested American Bar Association
committees to participate in drafting the laws.186 As a result,
180

Implicit in the question is, to whom should the power of enforcement be given?
As noted supra text accompanying notes 125-27, Congress failed to act on
comprehensive regulation in 2003; it proposed expedited rulemaking powers for the
FTC in 2009; and recently, it created a new federal agency tasked with consumer
protection. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. It is highly unlikely, then, that
Congress will now be a venue for regulation.
182
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995).
183
See White, supra note 135, at 2132.
184
Id. Indeed, it is also argued that because its product must be approved by
fifty state legislatures, NCCUSL is forced to engage in a much more careful
deliberative process. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will
Fail: Article 9, Capture and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 583 (1998).
185
See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 142-43 (1996).
186
Id.
181
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“the drafting process may be biased towards business rather
than consumer groups.”187 Unbalanced lobbying efforts also
result when the burdens of a proposed law fall on a small,
concentrated group while its benefits are distributed among a
large, diffuse group.188 In this context, “the small and
concentrated group can use its own resources . . . to acquire
rules favorable to itself and possibly detrimental to the larger,
diffuse group.”189 Besides producing a biased law, interest-group
involvement may hinder the ultimate ratification of uniform
laws. At the state level, interest-group opposition “can prevent
widespread adoption of an efficient NCCUSL proposal.”190
The UDMSA—and, indeed, any NCCUSL regulation of
the debt-services industry—is prone to these exact problems.
Debt-management-services providers bear the costs and
burdens of the regulation, while the benefits go to the diffuse
population of debt-holding consumers nationwide. Naturally,
this dynamic creates strong incentives for the debt-settlement
industry to participate in drafting the UDMSA. It likewise
creates very little incentive for the individual consumer to
participate, even though that consumer is within the
population that benefits.
NCCUSL proposals are also prone to negative results
when interest groups mount equal lobbying campaigns in
competition with each other. Often, active interest-group
competition results when a legislative proposal would
substantially change the status quo.191 The NCCUSL generally
reacts to coequal lobbying with a conservative stance—
adopting “no new rules at all” or “vague rules that appear to
accomplish something, but in fact do not.”192 Thus, if consumer
interests were equally represented in the lobbying and drafting
process, the UDMSA regulations would likely do little to effect
meaningful change in the debt-settlement industry.

187

Id. at 143. Consumers and consumer-oriented groups may also be much
better equipped to pressure public legislatures than the NCCUSL, given the latter’s
procedural inclusion of interest groups. Id. at 142-43. Similarly, public legislatures
have institutional tools that foster production of diverse and reliable information
whereas private legislatures do not. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 182, at 630.
188
Janger, supra note 184, at 584-85; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 143.
189
Janger, supra note 184, at 585.
190
Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 186, at 143.
191
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 183, at 636.
192
Id. at 637.
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In any event, the NCCUSL has a low rate of adoption in
state legislatures.193 Opposition to adopting a uniform law
makes failure the likely result, regardless of how proficient the
proposal may be.194 The UDMSA, though already enacted in
some states, would face sharp opposition from an acutely
interested industry if it imposed anything considered a
constraint on business.195 The goal of uniform laws is
uniformity; thus, uniform laws should not be proposed if there
is a risk of failure.196 Since the UDMSA is either likely to be
ineffective at regulating the debt-settlement industry or prone
to failure at the state level, uniform state laws are not the ideal
means of regulation in this context.
The FTC, by contrast, avoids both of these problems. As
an agency with a relatively broad mandate of authority, the
FTC is free of “interest group capture.”197 Moreover, the FTC’s
rules have uniform applicability.198 Unlike the UDMSA, FTC
rulemaking would create complete national coverage and

193

As of 1991, “[o]f the more than 200 uniform acts, 107 have been adopted by
fewer than ten states; 77 of those have not made the grade in even five states, and a
number of uniform acts have earned zero adoptions.” White, supra note 135, at 2103.
194
See id. at 2132. As one commentator has written,
The pull to make the law technically better is an engine of modest
horsepower. Going up even the smallest incline . . . it is soon unable to move
forward. When there is only a modest incline and no opposition, as in the case
of laws concerning procedural issues in the courts, this engine can carry its
load to the destination, but only in such circumstances.
Id.
195

It is difficult to ascertain the extent of the debt-settlement industry’s direct
involvement in the UDMSA’s drafting. But speaking to the general idea that the
industry is acutely aware and interested in any potential regulation, the FTC held a
public workshop on September 25, 2008, for which it received thirty-five public
comments from debt-settlement companies and trade associations. All these comments
are available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/index.shtm.
There is no reason to believe that the industry as a whole was and is any less
interested in the UDMSA.
196
See Janger, supra note 184, at 593 (arguing that, when certain
circumstances indicate that the uniform law process is likely to fail, the “NCCUSL
should decline to regulate the area and leave the question to federal law or nonuniform
state law”).
197
See Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer
Protection: Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
911, 938 (2005). In Milkis’s view, although the FTC was not institutionally or
historically designed to avoid capture, it has become the agency’s biggest strength. Id.
at 911-13. He supports this thesis with three case studies on consumer-protection
actions, including one examining the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Id. at 927.
198
See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,989 (Aug. 19, 2009).
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uniformity.199 And uniformity may prompt less industry
opposition. Since many debt-settlement companies operate
nationally, a uniform rule provides “the advantage[] of having
to comply with only one law.”200
Despite these strengths, however, there is a legitimate
concern that the FTC lacks the ability to effectively enforce its
own consumer-protection regulations. The agency has a relatively
small budget and is charged with overseeing a large number of
businesses and transactions.201 Of particular concern, “the sheer
number of actions the FTC can bring in any given year is
insignificant compared to the nature and scope of the consumer
protection problems plaguing consumers and honest businesses in
the United States.”202 As a result, most defrauded consumers thus
have no recourse after filing a complaint with the FTC.203
There is an easy solution to this problem: a private
cause of action. A private cause of action was expressly
considered and ultimately rejected when the FTC Act was
originally passed in 1914.204 Lawmakers recognized that,
because the FTC Act was purposefully broad, a private cause of
action would destroy predictability, be abused by plaintiffs’
attorneys, and burden the court system.205 While “the FTC was
composed of a body of experts and economists who could create
policy in a reasoned, orderly, and forward-looking fashion . . .
199

See Mark E. Budnitz, Martina Rojo & Julia Marlowe, Deceptive Claims for
Prepaid Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 14
(2006).
200
Id. Budnitz argues that the best approach to regulating prepaid telephone
cards is through federal legislation giving the FTC rulemaking authority. Congress has
already given the FTC authority to regulate the debt-settlement industry, as seen in
the FTC’s recent rulemaking. Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg.
48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). But Budnitz’s reasons for a
federal approach remain relevant in this context.
201
See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 442 (1991).
202
Robert M. Langer, Point: State Attorneys General Should Have Broad
Powers to Enforce a Federal Telemarketing Fraud Law, 5 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (1991).
203
Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind.
1976). The Guernsey court noted that
[m]ost defrauded customers have no remedy at all because the Government
cannot possibly act in more than a small fraction of all of the cases of deceit
and overreaching against consumers. The [FTC] currently receives about
9,000 complaints a year and is only able to investigate one out of eight or
nine of these, and, of the small fraction investigated, only one in ten results
in a cease and desist order.
Id.
204
205

Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 91, at 12.
Id. at 13-14.
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private lawsuits, on the other hand, create[] policy in a
piecemeal and retroactive manner.”206 The Act has not been
amended to include a private cause of action.207
The legislature’s concerns were valid when the FTC Act
was enacted and remain valid today. But the new FTC rules
regulating the debt-settlement industry do not trigger these
concerns. First, despite the breadth of the FTC Act, the new
rules are specific, top-down provisions that are not subject to
judicial discretion. In this context, a private cause of action
would not create policy retroactively. To the contrary, banning
specific actions by a debt-settlement company is an “orderly”
and “forward-looking” policy.208 And a private cause of action
would be a much-needed means of enforcement. Moreover,
there is little reason for concern that a private cause of action
would be exploited by plaintiffs or overburden the judiciary.
The vast majority of potential plaintiffs are low-income
consumers whose access to legal representation is, at the very
least, limited. Nor would a private cause of action compromise
predictability because this regulation is built of narrow, specific
provisions—unlike the FTC Act, which is broad and open to
interpretation.209
The cause of action allowed under the FTC regulations
is inadequate because it is preconditioned on an amount in
controversy exceeding $50,000.210 Losses to fraudulent debtsettlement companies are frequently no more than a few
thousand dollars per case. Moreover, individual consumers
cannot rely on the FTC to redress these losses. As discussed
earlier in this note, the FTC does not excel at this level of
enforcement.211 An unrestrained private cause of action
provided by FTC rulemaking is the best approach to regulate
the debt-settlement industry. Although the FTC’s recent rule
amendments are a good start, consumer protection means
nothing without enforcement. Without a private cause of
206

Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
208
Id. at 15.
209
Indeed, the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). A private cause of action would force courts to interpret this
phrase on a case-by-case basis. Contrast this with the FTC’s recent proposed rule,
which prohibits receiving a fee before a particular debt is settled. Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,020 (Aug. 19, 2009). Issues of interpretation arise in any
litigation, but even with a private cause of action, debt-settlement regulations would
result in much more predictability and much less ambiguity than the FTC Act.
210
15 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006).
211
See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
207
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action—one that does not impose a threshold amount in
controversy—the new regulations will often go unenforced,
substantially undermining their efficacy.
B.

Particulars of Regulation

The second question remains: of what particulars should
regulation be composed? Generally speaking, the UDMSA
focuses on registering companies, mandating education, and
imposing fee caps for debt settlement, whereas FTC
rulemaking emphasizes banning upfront fees. Both proposed
regulations include significant disclosure requirements.
Disclosure is a laudable characteristic of any business
practice. In this context, however, it has limited value.
Mandating disclosure often results in “creative compliance” by
companies—that is, printed communications too complicated or
convoluted for the average customer to understand.212
Regardless of the information’s clarity or value, consumers
frequently do not read contracts.213 Thus, requiring a company
to “inform” consumers that debt settlement may adversely
affect their credit scores, as the UDMSA does,214 is window
dressing that would benefit few consumers. In fact, many debtsettlement companies already disclose pertinent information—
voluntarily or pursuant to state law—but consumers are
uninformed nonetheless because they rarely read contracts.215
Further, the FTC Act and its state analogs also prohibit
companies’ questionable representations, albeit with less
clarity than would provisions tailored specifically to the debt-

212

Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing
Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617,
660-61 (2009); see generally Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques
of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (2005) (arguing that existing disclosure regimes—
particularly the Truth in Lending Act—fail to reduce information asymmetries in the
consumer-finance industry). Moreover, extensive disclosure requirements are worth
little when potential debt-settlement clients are in stressful financial situations;
“desperate consumers will tend to focus most on the representations made in the
advertisements about how these services can relieve them of their debt worries.” Letter
from Consumer Fed’n of Am. to the Sec’y of the Fed. Trade Comm’n 10 (Oct. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00161.pdf.
213
See Stark & Choplin, supra note 212, at 655-56.
214
UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT, § 17(d)(3) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 2005).
215
Letter from S. Brooklyn Legal Servs. to the Sec’y of the Fed. Trade Comm’n
7-8 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/54367000216.pdf.
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settlement industry.216 Disclosure would provide benefits for
certain consumers—possibly warranting inclusion—but it
cannot be the gravitas of this regulation.
Debt-settlement services have an enormous potential for
consumer financial harm. Damage results not only from high fees
but also from high failure rates. Legal action by creditors and
worsened credit scores are often unavoidable consequences of the
service as it exists today. Since this potential harm is the central
problem of the industry, it must be the focus of regulation.
Banning upfront fees is the proper solution to address
these problems. Advance fees allow debt-settlement companies
to benefit from client payment stagnation while taking no risk
of their own. Even if a consumer is unable to save money in
escrow (and thus does not proceed to benefit from the service),
debt-settlement companies still profit from advance fees.217 This
delay is fundamentally problematic for consumers: it increases
the risk of failure and creditor legal action while worsening
credit worthiness and doing nothing to lessen debt. Debtsettlement companies seek this business because it is
profitable. And they target consumers that cannot afford debtsettlement services in the first place.218 As an unregulated
service, debt-settlement companies can profit by contracting
with anyone holding unsecured debt.
A ban on upfront fees provides these companies with a
natural incentive to screen clients for potential success.
Prohibiting advance fees increases the profit margin that exists
in clients that could actually save enough money to effectuate a
settlement. With an advance-fee bar in place, companies will
voluntarily screen potential clients, limiting abusive

216

See supra Part III.
See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to the Sec’y of the Fed. Trade
Comm’n 9 (Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Letter to FTC], available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00192.pdf (arguing that, without a ban on advance
fees, “there is minimal incentive for debt relief companies charging up-front fees to
perform services because they collect these substantial fees regardless of whether they
negotiate anything for the consumer, succeed in settling any of the consumer’s debts for
a reduced amount, or take any action at all on behalf of the consumer”).
218
See id. (stating concern that “the current regulatory regime—in which
collection of substantial up-front fees is not prohibited—is such that increasing
numbers of unscrupulous operators will flock to this industry”). This comment also
references a classified advertisement in a Portland, Oregon, newspaper that claimed,
“This is truly the NEXT WAVE!! I’m sure you heard about it. Debt Settlement! . . . You
can be part of it and make a fantastic residual income!!! You too can potentially earn a
Million dollars in the next 12 months! Free Complete Training! No Fee To Become An
Affiliate!” Id. at 9 n.14.
217
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contracting.219 It would also force companies to provide services
quickly and efficiently—to work with a client’s creditors earlier
in the process to achieve an earlier payday. Banning upfront
fees would increase overall success rates, minimize creditor
action because of shortened default periods and ensure that
consumers owe fees only once a benefit has been realized.
The industry claims that debt-settlement companies are
unable to operate without upfront fees. It bases this claim on
several arguments. First, the industry argues that the
settlement process is continuous and ongoing, making advance
payment a requirement for creditor communication, and that
creditor communication is the relevant unit of work justifying
compensation.220 Second, debt-settlement companies have
relatively large client-acquisition costs, which justify advance
fees.221 Finally, the industry warns that only large existing
companies would be able to operate without upfront fees,
meaning that the ban would harm competition.222
These objections are without merit. The hypothetical
value of debt settlement is reducing a consumer’s debt load by
negotiating settlements with creditors. The value does not
derive from general communication with creditors, nor does it
derive from an expanded client base. Consumers are willing to
pay fees to have their debts settled—not for a company to
communicate with their creditors.223 Every business has costs
associated with its intended results. The entitlement to profit
219

Over the past decade, various state laws have attempted to rein in
subprime and other predatory home-loan providers by banning upfront fees. See Daniel
Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development, and the
Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 470-71 (2009). Some studies suggest that
antipredatory lending laws discouraged providers from offering the riskiest loans. Id.
at 483-84; Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending 19-20
(OCC Working Paper July 30, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/working
paper.pdf. In the case of debt settlement, a ban on upfront fees would discourage
companies from contracting with the riskiest clients (i.e., those most unable to
complete a debt-settlement program and thus most likely to gain no benefit from debt
settlement).
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Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Workshop: Consumer Protection
and Debt Settlement Industry, at 189 (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter FTC Transcript]
(statement of Michael Mallow), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
debtsettlement/OfficialTranscript.pdf (“I don’t believe that in a debt settlement
company the unit of work is the successful completion of the settlement and the
satisfaction thereof.”); see also id. at 113 (statement of Jack Craven).
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ASS’N OF SETTLEMENT COS., STUDY ON THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 45 (2007) [hereinafter STUDY ON THE INDUSTRY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/debtsettlementworkshop/536796-00014.pdf.
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FTC Transcript, supra note 220, at 187 (statement of Wesley Young).
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See Letter to FTC, supra note 217, at 10 (“[I]t is marketing, lead generation
and referral costs that drive the debt settlement industry’s zeal for up-front fees.”).
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comes from providing a service that has a client value greater
than its provider costs. Debt-settlement companies deserve
payment only after a client has received a benefit—that is, once
a debt has been settled.
To be sure, the ban on advance fees could potentially
constrain competition. The FTC noted that a “prohibition could
increase the costs incurred by any legitimate providers of debtrelief services, make it impossible for some firms to continue to
exist, and reduce the ability of new firms to enter the
market.”224 A ban may necessitate “additional capitalization, in
the form of borrowing or investment.”225 As a result, the
industry claims, debt settlement will become more expensive
and less accessible. But the industry is currently contracting
with far more consumers than it can reasonably provide
beneficial services for.226 The ban on advance fees would
eliminate predatory firms, allowing legitimate settlement
providers to fairly compete in the market and price their
services accurately. To the extent that constrained supply
would increase the costs of debt-settlement services, these costs
“would be unlikely to outweigh the consumer injury resulting
from the current fee practice.”227 Banning upfront fees mitigates
the most harmful aspect of debt settlement without creating
unreasonable costs for the industry.
For precisely these reasons, banning upfront fees is more
desirable than the UDMSA approach of imposing fee
maximums. While a fee maximum would hypothetically save a
client more money in escrow, since less would be taken for fees
(much as banning advance fees would), it does not give the debtsettlement company any incentive to complete settlement
services more efficiently. Fee maximums would not compel client
screening because clients with no chance of completing
companies’ settlement programs would still be profitable. There
is also no incentive to mitigate creditor intervention because
224

Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 42,008 (Aug. 19, 2009).
Id. Some form of capital reserve via bond or insurance is required under
the UDMSA to protect against insolvency in the event of a judgment against the
company. UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT §§ 13, 14 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 2005). The UDMSA’s registration requirement is largely intended to
effectuate this mandated capitalization. Banning upfront fees might also force debtsettlement companies to maintain a reserve and may mitigate the need to impose
registration requirements on debt-settlement companies.
226
A voluntary study conducted by an industry trade association reported success
rates only as high as 60%. STUDY ON THE INDUSTRY, supra note 221, at 1. This means that,
at minimum, 40% of debt-settlement clients realize no benefits from the service.
227
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42,008.
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these companies would collect fees—albeit at a more modest
level—regardless of whether a client falls further into financial
turmoil. The ban on upfront fees is the most advantageous
approach to regulating the debt-settlement industry, and the
FTC is wise to adopt it as its regulatory centerpiece instead of
fee maximums or mere compelled disclosure.
CONCLUSION
The debt-settlement industry is likely to continue its
rapid growth. But the existing regulation is insufficient to
protect consumers from the harm caused by debt settlement.
Neither the UDMSA nor the FTC’s recent rulemaking are
perfect, but each contains elements helpful in ensuring that
debt-settlement
programs
provide
financial
benefits.
Ultimately, the FTC’s recent regulation banning upfront fees is
a strong start. Still, the FTC must also provide for an
unreserved private cause of action to guarantee proper
enforcement. As it stands now, debt settlement is a beast that
tramples consumer welfare. But with the proper reins, debt
settlement can provide legitimate help to those facing the
burden of unsecured debt.
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